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In real-world decision making, choice outcomes, and their probabilities are often not known
a priori but must be learned from experience.The dopamine hypothesis of cognitive aging
predicts that component processes of experience-based decision making (information
search and stimulus–reward association learning) decline with age. Many existing stud-
ies in this domain have used complex neuropsychological tasks that are not optimal for
testing predictions about speciﬁc cognitive processes. Here we used an experimental
sampling paradigm with real monetary payoffs that provided separate measures of infor-
mation search and choice for gains and losses. Compared with younger adults, older adults
sought less information about uncertain risky options. However, like younger adults, older
participants also showed evidence of adaptive decision making. When the desirable out-
come of the risky option was rare (p = 0.10 or 0.20), both age groups engaged in more
information search and made fewer risky choices, compared with when the desirable out-
come of the risky option was frequent (p = 0.80 or 0.90). Furthermore, loss options elicited
more sampling and greater modulation of risk taking, compared with gain options. Overall,
these ﬁndings support predictions of the dopamine hypothesis of cognitive aging, but they
also highlight the need for additional research into the interaction of age and valence (gain
vs. loss) on experience-based choice.
Keywords: aging, dopamine, financial decisions, choice, sampling paradigm
INTRODUCTION
Decision making in everyday life often involves choosing among
options that vary with respect to potential payoffs and outcome
probabilities. Typically, payoffs and risks are not known a priori
but must be inferred from past experience (e.g., Hertwig et al.,
2004). For example, a commuter may have to choose between
alternate routes to work. One route may be more direct (high pay-
off) but carry a larger risk of delays, whereas another route may
be longer (low payoff) but carry no risk of delays. In this sce-
nario, a poor decision may cost the decision maker no more than
a few minutes of commuting time. In high-stakes domains such as
healthcare, ﬁnancial planning, and consumer choice, however, the
costs associated with maladaptive decisions can be considerable.
What characterizes adaptive decision making in the context of
experience-based risky choice? One aspect is predecisional infor-
mation search, or the extent to which the decision maker explores
the available options prior to making a choice. In the commuting
example, the decision maker’s chances of choosing the optimal
route are likely to increase as a function of the number of times that
she has used each route before. A second aspect is stimulus–reward
learning, or the ability to learn frompositive andnegative feedback.
If the decision maker is insensitive to successes (short commutes)
and failures (long commutes), her choices are unlikely to change
as a function of past experience. A third aspect of adaptive deci-
sion making is adaptive choice. This refers to the degree to which
the decision maker modulates her choices according to the level
of risk, risk being deﬁned by the probability or the variability of
the possible outcomes of a choice (Glimcher, 2008). For example,
other things being equal, routes with a small probability of delays
should be chosen more often than routes with a high probability
of delays.
The effects of aging on decision making have recently moved to
the forefront of research in psychology and neuroeconomics. This
trend has been partly motivated by evidence of age-related decline
in dopaminergic neurotransmission in the brain (e.g.,Wang et al.,
1998; Kaasinen et al., 2000). According to the “dopamine hypoth-
esis” of cognitive aging (e.g., Li et al., 2001; Braver and Barch,
2002; Bäckman et al., 2006, 2010), deﬁcient dopaminergic neuro-
modulation is one of the causes of age-related cognitive decline. In
younger adults, dopaminergically innervated brain structures such
as the ventral striatumand the ventromedial prefrontal cortex have
been linked to decision-relevant functions such as information
search and exploration (e.g., Düzel et al., 2010), stimulus–reward
learning (e.g., Schultz, 2000), as well as the coding of uncer-
tainty (e.g., Fiorillo et al., 2003; Fiorillo, 2011). According to the
dopamine hypothesis of aging, each of these aspects of experience-
based choice should therefore show age-related decline. However,
the evidence from extant behavioral and neuroimaging studies is
mixed.
Behavioral studies in domains such as consumer choice and
medical decision making suggest that compared with younger
adults, older adults prefer to have fewer choice options (Reed
et al., 2008), seek less variety (Novak and Mather, 2007), and,
critically, seek less information about choice options (for reviews,
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see Mather, 2006; Mata and Nunes, 2010). At least two studies
indicate, however, that age-related decline in information seeking
may be limited to situations in which choice options have neg-
ative features (Mather et al., 2005; Lockenhoff and Carstensen,
2007). This ﬁnding has been explained in terms of socioemo-
tional selectivity theory (Carstensen et al., 1999), which postulates
that age-related reductions in time perspective lead older adults to
prioritize emotion-regulation goals at the expense of information-
seeking goals. By this account, older adults may avoid seeking out
negative information about choice options in order to protect their
emotional well-being.
Stimulus–reward learning in younger and older adults has
been investigated with a number of different neuropsychological
and neuroimaging tasks. Studies using variants of the Probabilis-
tic Object Reversal Task (Heekeren et al., 2007), which requires
ﬂexible adjustment to changes in stimulus–reward contingencies,
have revealed age-related decline in learning from positive feed-
back (Mell et al., 2005), as well as under-activation of the ventral
striatum in response to reward cues (Mell et al., 2009). In the
Iowa gambling task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994), participants make
repeated draws from decks of cards that differ with respect to their
expected value. To maximize their scores, participants must learn
to choose“good decks”over“bad decks,”an ability that is impaired
in patientswith damage in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (e.g.,
Bechara et al., 2000). Successful performance requires learning
of outcome contingencies, but likely also taps other cognitive–
affective processes (e.g., Wood et al., 2005). Findings with healthy
older adults have been mixed, with some studies showing age-
related deﬁcits (Denburg et al., 2005; Fein et al., 2007; Zamarian
et al., 2008), and others reporting no age differences (Kovalchik
et al., 2005; Wood et al., 2005; see also Hosseini et al., 2010). There
is also no consistent evidence for age-by-valence effects on learning
(but see Wood et al., 2005; Denburg et al., 2006). In the Probabilis-
tic Selection Task (Frank et al., 2004), participants have to acquire
positive and negative outcome contingencies, and there are sepa-
rate learning measures for both. One study using this task with
“younger-old” and “older-old” participants suggested that neg-
ative feedback may be more effective than positive feedback in
the second group, possibly due to low tonic dopamine levels in
advanced old age (Frank and Kong, 2008). In a more recent study
with younger and older adults (Hämmerer et al., 2011), there was
evidence of age-related decline in stimulus–reward learning, as
well as a negative learning bias in older adults. There are also
data suggesting that the proportion of individuals with a negative
learning bias may increase with age (Simon et al., 2010). However,
Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007, supplementary materials) found no
age-by-valence interaction in a probabilistic learning task. Finally,
neuroimaging studies with the monetary incentive delay (MID)
task (Knutson et al., 2001), designed to separate brain activa-
tions related to anticipation and receipt of monetary gains and
losses, have shown age-related reductions in anticipatory brain
signals (Schott et al., 2007; Dreher et al., 2008). These ﬁndings
have added to the evidence that reward-based learning is impaired
in older adults. However, in one study with the MID task, older
adults showed anticipatory responses similar to those observed in
younger adults, at least during gain anticipation (Samanez-Larkin
et al., 2007). Striatal activity associated with outcome processing
also appears to be normal in older adults (Cox et al., 2008). In sum-
mary, the literature on stimulus–reward learning is mixed. There
is a fair amount of evidence for an age-related learning deﬁcit, but
to what extent this deﬁcit is modulated by valence is as yet unclear.
A ﬁnal aspect of experience-based decision making is risk pref-
erence. Given two options of identical expected value, a risk-averse
decision maker prefers low-risk to high-risk options (for a full
deﬁnition of the term, see Glimcher, 2008). The idea that older
adults are more risk-averse than younger adults has a long history
in psychology (for an early review, see Okun, 1976), but empiri-
cal support for it is surprisingly scant. Studies of risky choice in
real-world domains such as ﬁnancial planning and gambling have
often failed to show age-related increases in risk aversion (for a
review, see Mather, 2006). A recent quantitative meta-analysis of
the experimental literature (Mata et al., 2011) indicates that the
size and direction of age differences in risk preference depends
strongly on the task, with no evidence for task-general age-related
changes. This heterogeneity is also illustrated by the two existing
neuroimaging studies of aging and risky choice. In one of these
studies (Lee et al., 2008), older adults made more risk-averse gam-
bling decisions. They also showed greater activation in the right
insula when choosing risky options, perhaps reﬂecting a stronger
negative anticipatory response to risk. However, in another study
(Samanez-Larkin et al., 2010) using a ﬁnancial investment task,
older adults were more risk-seeking than younger adults. Interest-
ingly, this effect was shown to be associated with increased vari-
ability in subcortical brain activity, consistent with Li et al.’s (2001)
proposal that age-related dopaminergic decline leads to increased
“neural noise” and reduced sensitivity to outcome probabilities.
Overall, there is no clear evidence for a systematic age-related shift
in risk preferences. Instead, age differences in task-speciﬁc risk
preferences may reﬂect differences in the learning demands of the
tasks (Mata et al., 2011).
In summary, the dopamine hypothesis of cognitive aging pre-
dicts that critical aspects of experience-based decision making
(information search and stimulus–reward learning) undergo age-
related decline.While this prediction has received support in some
studies, there are many inconsistent ﬁndings, perhaps partly due
to the diversity and complexity of the paradigms used (e.g., the
IGT). Few studies have systematically compared younger and
older adults on multiple components of experience-based risky
choice within the same experimental setting (but see Deakin et al.,
2004). Furthermore, only about half of the existing studies have
used monetary incentives (Mata et al., 2011). There is a dearth
of studies comparing gain- and loss-related decisions (Mata et al.,
2011), even though several lines of evidence suggest that agingmay
affect the two types of choices differently (e.g., Mather et al., 2005;
Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007; Frank and Kong, 2008). Finally, we
noted a lack of theoretical integration between the neuropsycho-
logical and aging literatures,on the one hand,and the growingﬁeld
on experience-based choice research in the behavioral economics
literature, on the other (for reviews, see Hertwig and Erev, 2009;
Rakow and Newell, 2010). Together, these observations provided
the rationale for the current study.
Younger and older adults completed a computerized sampling
task (Hau et al., 2010). Participants were presented with a series
of ﬁnancial choice problems requiring a choice between a certain
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option (e.g., $3 for sure) and a risky option (e.g., $4 with a prob-
ability of 0.80, else nothing). The certain option was described
explicitly, whereas the risky option had to be explored through
active sampling. Because each choice problem features only one
uncertain option, the task is less complex than the otherwise sim-
ilar IGT, in which participants must track outcomes for multiple
decks of cards. The sampling task provides separate measures of
information search and choice, and it allows for a direct com-
parison of gain-related and loss-related decisions. It also involves
manipulation of two aspects of risk: outcome probability and pay-
off variability (i.e., the SD of the outcomes of the risky option;Hau
et al., 2010), neither of which has been systematically investigated
in the aging literature.
We tested the following hypotheses:
1. In linewith the idea that age-related dopaminergic decline leads
to reduced information seeking (Düzel et al., 2010),we hypoth-
esized that older adults would sample less than younger adults
before making choices.
2. We predicted that participants would show adaptive decision
making by modulating their choices according to objective out-
come probabilities (“adaptive choice”; see also Deakin et al.,
2004). On the assumption that information search and choice
behavior reﬂect similar dopaminergic inﬂuences (Düzel et al.,
2010), we made the novel prediction that sampling would also
be sensitive to variations in outcome probabilities (“adaptive
sampling”).
3. Based on the idea that age-related dopaminergic decline results
in noisy memory representations (Li et al., 2001; Samanez-
Larkin et al., 2010), as well as prior evidence of impaired
stimulus–reward learning in older adults (for a review, see
Mohr et al., 2010), we hypothesized that adaptive sampling
and adaptive choice would show age-related decline.
Additional questions for which the prior literature provided no
clear hypotheses were (1) how the valence of the choice options
(gain vs. loss) would affect age differences in experience-based
decision making; (2) whether younger and older adults would
differ with respect to overall risk preference; and (3) how pay-
off variability would affect age differences in experience-based
decision making.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
All participants gavewritten informed consent for the study,which
was approved by the Research Ethics Board at Ryerson University.
Participants in the ﬁnal sample included 40 younger adults (35
women) who were students at Ryerson University and received
course credit for their participation, as well as 41 community-
dwelling older adults (32 women) who received a $10 travel reim-
bursement. Participants in both groups also had the opportunity
to win monetary rewards for their performance in the experimen-
tal task. Eight additional younger adults were excluded for failing
to meet one or more of the criteria for inclusion: absence of major
health problems (e.g., history of neurological or psychiatric illness,
cancer, cardiovascular disease), normal, or corrected-to-normal
vision and hearing, and a score of 27 or higher on the Mini-Mental
Status Examination (Folstein et al., 1975). Two additional older
adults were excluded for failing to follow the experimental instruc-
tions. Characteristics of the ﬁnal sample are shown in Table 1.
Comparedwith younger adults,older adults had signiﬁcantlymore
years of education, t (79)= 5.86, p< 0.01 and scored higher on the
Mill-Hill Vocabulary Scale (Raven, 1982), t (77)= 8.59, p< 0.01.
Scores on a numeracy questionnaire (Reyna and Brainerd, 2008)
showed no signiﬁcant age difference.
DESIGN
The study employed a mixed factorial design that included the
between-subjects factor age group (younger, older) and two
within-subjects factors: (1) valence (gain, loss), (2) the probabil-
ity of the desirable outcome of the risky option (pdesirable: 0.10,
0.20, 0.80, 0.90), and (3) the payoff variability of the risky option
($1.6, $4.5, $9.6). Dependent variables were the sampling fre-
quency, which provided a measure of information search, and
the proportion of risky choices, which provided an index of risk
taking.
STIMULI AND APPARATUS
We used the 12 choice problems (Hau et al., 2010; Experiment 1)
shown in Table 2. In each problem, participants chose between
a risky option (winning X with probability pnon-zero, or 0 with
probability 1 − pnon-zero) and a certain option (winning Y with
probability 1.0). Y was either slightly below or slightly above the
expected value of the risky option. For example, in Problem 1, the
expected value of the risky option was $0.53, and Y was either
$0.30 or $0.70. For each participant, half of the problems used the
smaller value of Y and half used the larger value of Y. The assign-
ment of speciﬁc problems to the ﬁrst group (small Y ) and the
second group (large Y ), respectively, was counterbalanced across
participants.
In Hau et al.’s (2010) protocol, all problems involved choosing
between risky and certain gains (i.e.,X and Y were always positive
numbers). In contrast, we presented participants with both gain
and loss problems. To this end, we created a loss version of each
problem. For example, the loss version of Problem 1 required par-
ticipants to choose between a 10% chance of losing $5.30 (risky
option) and a 100% chance of losing $0.30/$0.70 (certain option).
For the purpose of data analysis, the variable pnon-zero (prob-
ability of the non-zero outcome) was recoded into pdesirable
(probability of the desirable outcome), with the following
Table 1 | Participant characteristics, by age group.
Characteristic Younger adults (N =40) Older adults (N =41)
Age (years) 20.8 (5.3) 68.2 (6.8)
Age range 17–41 60–89
Education (years) 13.6 (1.3) 16.3 (2.64)
MMSE 29.63 (0.70) 29.33 (1.10)
Mill-Hill vocabulary 14.62 (3.44) 22.83 (4.91)
Numeracy 7.98 (1.91) 8.07 (1.79)
MMSE, Mini-Mental State Exam (Folstein et al., 1975). See text for additional
information. SD are shown in parentheses.
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rationale.Adaptive decisionmaking involvesmaximizingdesirable
outcomes. On gain trials, it is adaptive to choose the risky option
when pnon-zero (the probability of a gain) is high. On loss trials, it is
adaptive to choose the risky option when pnon-zero (the probability
of a loss) is low. To conduct meaningful comparisons between gain
and loss trials, pdesirable is therefore more useful than pnon-zero. For
gain trials, pdesirable equaled pnon-zero. For loss trials, pdesirable was
the probability of a non-loss, or 1 − pnon-zero.
E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) was used for
stimulus presentation and response collection on an Intel Core 2
Duo 2.40 GHz laptop with 4 GB of RAM and a 16.0′′ LCD display
running 32-bit Windows 7 Enterprise Edition. Viewing distance
was approximately 50 cm. All text appeared in black 18-point Cal-
ibri font against a white background. Participants pressed the “X”
and “,” keys with their left and right index ﬁngers to give their
responses.
Table 2 |Twelve choice problems (Hau et al., 2010).
Problem Risky option:
pnon-zero
Risky option:
X (in CAD)
Payoff
variability
Certain option:
Y (in CAD)
1 0.10 5.30 1.60 0.30/0.70
2 0.20 4 1.60 0.60/1.00
3 0.80 4 1.60 3.00/3.40
4 0.90 5.30 1.60 4.60/5.00
5 0.10 15 4.50 1.30/1.70
6 0.20 11.30 4.50 2.10/2.50
7 0.80 11.30 4.50 8.80/9.20
8 0.90 15 4.50 13.30/13.70
9 0.10 32 9.60 3.00/3.40
10 0.20 24 9.60 11.80/12.20
11 0.80 24 9.60 19.00/19.40
12 0.90 32 9.60 28.60/29.00
pnon-zero, probability of the non-zero outcome in the risky option. X, non-zero out-
come of the risky option. CAD, Canadian dollars. Payoff variability is the SD of the
risky option. Y, outcome of the certain option. Only the gain version of each
problem is shown; the loss version was identical except that X and Y had a
negative sign.
PROCEDURE
Participants were tested individually in a quiet testing room.
After signing a consent form, participants received instructions
for the choice task and completed four practice problems. After
the practice, the experimenter repeated the instructions and pro-
vided clariﬁcation if necessary. Participants were informed that
they would start with a balance of $0, and that the computer
would keep track of their gains and losses throughout the study.
Participants were also told that they would receive their ﬁnal
balance in cash, if it was greater than 0. Older adults were
reassured that the experimental rewards would be paid in addi-
tion to the compensation they would receive for participating in
the study.
The 24 trials of the choice task included 12 gain and 12 loss
problems, presented in random order. At the beginning of each
trial, an on-screenmessage informedparticipants of thenumber of
the upcoming trial (1–24). The message also indicated whether the
upcoming trial was a gain trial (“you should try to maximize your
gains”) or a loss trial (“you should try to minimize your losses”).
The risky option and the certain option were then presented side-
by-side on the screen, separated by a central black vertical line
(Figure 1). The left/right assignment of the two options was coun-
terbalanced across trials for each participant. The outcome of the
certain option was presented explicitly, whereas the risky option
(symbolized by the playing card with a question mark) had to be
explored through sampling. Participants were told that their bal-
ance would not be affected by the sample outcomes, and that they
should sample the risky option until they felt that they knew which
option they preferred. Participants sampled by pressing a key and
immediately saw the outcome of the sample superimposed on the
playing card. Each sample outcome was a random draw from the
probability distribution of the risky option.After each sample,par-
ticipants indicated, again via button press, whether they wished to
continue sampling or to make their ﬁnal choice. After they had ﬁn-
ished sampling and made their ﬁnal choice of either the certain or
the risky option, a feedback screen indicated the trial outcome. If
the participant had chosen the risky option, the outcomewas again
determined by a random draw from the probability distribution
of the risky option. All aspects of the trials were participant-paced,
and there was no upper limit on the number of samples drawn on
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the trial sequence.The example shows the loss
version of Problem 4 (seeTable 2). The certain option (losing $3.40) is
presented on the left, the risky option (losing $4 with probability 0.80, losing
nothing with probability 0.20) is on the right. The participant samples the risky
option four times and experiences both outcomes twice. The participant’s
ﬁnal choice is the risky option, resulting in a $4 loss.
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a given trial. After the last trial, the ﬁnal balance was shown on the
screen.
At the end of the session, participants completed a set of paper-
and-pencil questionnaires, including the Numeracy scale (Reyna
and Brainerd, 2008), an 11-item questionnaire measuring pro-
ﬁciency with fractions, proportions, decimals, and percentages,
and the Mill-Hill Vocabulary Scale, a 33-item vocabulary test
in multiple-choice format (Raven, 1982). The experimenter also
administered the Mini-Mental State Exam (Folstein et al., 1975).
Afterward, participant were paid (if applicable) and debriefed
about the goals of the study.
RESULTS
The analyses focused on two aspects of experience-based decision
making: information search, operationalized as the sampling fre-
quency, and choice, operationalized as the proportion of risky ﬁnal
choices. Analyzing the effects of all independent variables in a sin-
gle step was not possible due to the small item set (see Table 2).
We thus conducted two sets of analyses for each dependent vari-
able. Because of the signiﬁcant age-group difference in educational
attainment (see Participants), the variable“years of education”was
mean-centered and included as a covariate in the analyses below
(Delaney and Maxwell, 1981). Vocabulary, which also showed an
age difference, was not included as an additional covariate because
it was signiﬁcantly correlated with education (r = 0.43, p< 0.01).
INFORMATION SEARCH: SAMPLING FREQUENCY
In the ﬁrst analysis, we collapsed the sampling frequencies
across the levels of the payoff variability factor (Figure 2) and
conducted a 2 (age group: younger, older) × 2 (valence: gain,
loss)× 4 (pdesirable: 0.10, 0.20, 0.80, 0.90) mixed analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) with education as a covariate. Consis-
tent with Hypothesis 1 (age-related reduction in overall sam-
pling frequency), the main effect of age group was signiﬁcant,
F(1, 78)= 5.08, p = 0.03, partial η2 = 0.06, with older adults
(M = 6.84) sampling less than younger adults (M = 10.73). The
main effect of valence was signiﬁcant, F(1, 78)= 4.11, p = 0.05,
partial η2 = 0.05, reﬂecting the fact that loss trials elicited more
sampling (M = 9.09) than gain trials (M = 8.47). A signiﬁ-
cant main effect of pdesirable, F(3, 234)= 19.37, p< 0.01, partial
η2 = 0.20, was qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction of age group
and pdesirable, F(3, 234)= 4.72, p< 0.01, partial η2 = 0.06. Con-
sistent with Hypothesis 2 (adaptive sampling), planned linear
contrasts indicated that younger adults sampled more as pdesirable
decreased,F(1, 38)= 14.03,p< 0.01, partial η2 = 0.27. Consistent
with Hypothesis 3 (age-related reduction in adaptive sampling),
the effect was only marginally signiﬁcant in older adults, F(1,
39)= 3.63, p = 0.06, partial η2 = 0.09. There was no signiﬁcant
interaction of age and valence on sampling frequencies.
In the second analysis, we collapsed the sampling frequencies
across the levels of pdesirable (Figure 3) and conducted a 2 (age
group)× 2 (valence)× 3 (payoff variability: 1.6, $4.5, $9.6) mixed
ANCOVA with education as a covariate. In addition to the signiﬁ-
cantmain effects of age groupandvalence, reported in theprevious
analysis, there was a signiﬁcant interaction of valence and payoff
variability, F(2, 156)= 3.18, p = 0.04, partial η2 = 0.04. Follow-
up linear contrasts indicated that payoff variability had no effect
FIGURE 2 | Sampling frequency as a function of valence and the
probability of the desirable outcome (pdesirable), for younger and older
adults. Adjusted means for the average level of the covariate (years of
education) are shown. Error bars indicate SEM.
on sampling frequency for gain trials. For loss trials, increases in
payoff variability were associated with increased sampling, F(1,
78)= 6.47, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.08.
RISK TAKING: PROPORTION OF RISKY CHOICES
In the ﬁrst analysis, we collapsed the proportions of risky choices
across the levels of the payoff variability factor (Figure 4)
and conducted a 2 (age group)× 2 (valence)× 4 (pdesirable)
mixed ANCOVA with education as a covariate. The main effect
of pdesirable was signiﬁcant, F(3, 234)= 49.06, p< 0.01, partial
η2 = 0.39. It was qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcantValence× pdesirable inter-
action, F(3, 234)= 6.84, p< 0.01, partial η2 = 0.08. Consistent
with Hypothesis 2 (adaptive risk taking), planned linear contrasts
indicated that risk taking increased as pdesirable increased, suggest-
ing that both age groups engaged in adaptive risk taking. This
was the case for both gain trials, F(1, 78)= 24.16, p< 0.01, par-
tial η2 = 0.24, and loss trials, F(1, 78)= 78.81, p< 0.01, partial
η2 = 0.50, but the effect was more pronounced for loss trials than
for gain trials (Figure 4). There was no signiﬁcant interaction
of age group and pdesirable, contrary to Hypothesis 3 (age-related
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FIGURE 3 | Sampling frequency as a function of valence and payoff
variability, for younger and older adults. Adjusted means for the average
level of the covariate (years of education) are shown. Error bars indicate
SEM.
reduction in adaptive risk taking). Age group and valence also did
not interact signiﬁcantly.
In the second analysis, we collapsed the proportions of risky
choices across the levels of pdesirable (Figure 5) and conducted a 2
(age group)× 2 (valence)× 3 (payoff variability) mixedANCOVA
with education as a covariate. The only signiﬁcant effect was the
interaction of valence and payoff variability, F(2, 156)= 8.03,
p< 0.01, partial η2 = 0.09. Follow-up contrasts showed a signiﬁ-
cant quadratic effect of payoff variability on theproportionof risky
choices for gain trials, F(1, 78)= 5.94, p = 0.02, partial η2 = 0.07,
with the medium level of payoff variability producing the highest
proportion of risky choices. For loss trials, there was a signiﬁcant
linear effect of payoff variability, F(1, 78)= 15.82, p< 0.01, par-
tial η2 = 0.17, reﬂecting a linear increase in the proportion of risky
choices with increasing payoff variability.
DISCUSSION
In this experiment, younger and older adults completed a series of
decision problems involving choices between certain and risky
ﬁnancial options. In each problem, the risky option was not
FIGURE 4 |The proportion of risky choices as a function of valence and
the probability of the desirable outcome (pdesirable), for younger and
older adults. Adjusted means for the average level of the covariate (years
of education) are shown. Error bars show the SEM.
explicitly described, but had to be explored through sampling. To
test a set of predictions derived from the literature on dopamine,
aging, and cognition (Li et al., 2001; Frank and Kong, 2008; Düzel
et al., 2010), we analyzed the effects of age, valence, the probability
of the desirable outcome in the risky option, and payoff vari-
ability on two dependent measures: sampling frequency, which
provided an index of information search, and the proportion of
risky choices, which provided an index of risk taking.
As predicted (Hypothesis 1), older adults overall sampled less
than younger adults. This ﬁnding is consistent with the proposal
that aging is associated with reduced exploratory drive due to
dopaminergic decline (Düzel et al., 2010). Alternatively, it is pos-
sible that sampling frequency is constrained by working-memory
capacity (e.g., Rakow et al., 2010), and that the reduced sampling
in older adults is a consequence of age-related decline in work-
ing memory (e.g., Hasher and Zacks, 1988). Working memory is
closely tied to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (e.g., D’Esposito
et al., 1995; Cohen et al., 1997), a region that receives dopamin-
ergic input and undergoes signiﬁcant structural change in aging
(e.g., Grady et al., 1994; Raz et al., 2005). We did not obtain a
measure of working-memory capacity and thus could not test this
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FIGURE 5 |The proportion of risky choices as a function of valence and
the payoff variability, for younger and older adults. Adjusted means for
the average level of the covariate (years of education) are shown. Error bars
show the SEM.
hypothesis directly. However, the young-adult literature suggests
that access to explicit memory representations may not be critical
for experience-based choice. In one study, memory demands were
lifted entirely by providing participants with a visual record of
their sampling histories (Hau et al., 2010, Experiment 1). Choice
patterns in the visual-record condition did not differ signiﬁcantly
from those in the standard sampling condition – even when par-
ticipants were forced to sample as many as 50 times. Furthermore,
lower animals (e.g., worker bees) show experience-based choice
patterns that resemble those of humans (Weber et al., 2004). These
ﬁndings suggest that implicit, rather than explicit, memory repre-
sentations may drive experience-based choice, and that working
memory may not play a major role. Indeed, in one recent study,
decision quality in an experience-based investment task was unaf-
fected by the addition of a secondary task, for both younger and
older adults (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2011). Even so, it is possible
that older adults use working-memory load as a metacognitive
heuristic for terminating their information search. One strat-
egy for testing these possibilities in future research would be to
adopt the visual-record method of Hau et al. (2010; see also
Samanez-Larkin et al., 2011). If the age-related difference in
sampling frequency results from working-memory limitations
rather than from reduced exploratory drive, then providing par-
ticipants with a visual record of their sampling histories should
eliminate age differences in sampling.
In line with Hypothesis 2, both younger and older adults
showed adaptive decision making by adjusting their sampling and
choice behavior in response to variation in the probability of the
desirable outcome of the risky option. Adaptive choice of this kind
has been demonstrated previously (e.g., Deakin et al., 2004; Hau
et al., 2010), but we are not aware of previous reports of adaptive
sampling. At a mechanistic level, the effect can be parsimoniously
explained in terms of dopaminergic modulation of both informa-
tion search/exploration and risk taking. At the subjective level, the
increased samplingwhen the desirable outcome is rare (p = 0.10 or
0.20) may be associated with increased curiosity (i.e., anticipation
of epistemic reward; e.g., Kang et al., 2009). In future research,
think-aloud protocols during the sampling phase could help to
shed light on the association between the subjective experience of
curiosity and predecisional information search.
Based on theoretical models of “noisy processing” due to
reduced dopaminergic neuromodulation in older adults (Li et al.,
2001), as well as empirical evidence for impaired feedback learn-
ing in older adults (for a review, see Mohr et al., 2010), we had
predicted that adaptive decision making would show age-related
decline (Hypothesis 3). This hypothesis was supported for sam-
pling, where older adults showed signiﬁcantly ﬂatter functions
than younger adults (Figure 2). However, there was no evidence
for an age-related deﬁcit in adaptive choice (Figure 4). This disso-
ciation indicates that age-related dopaminergic decline may affect
information search more strongly than choice. Incidentally, the
dissociation also suggests that sampling frequency had little effect
on choice, at least within the range of sampling frequencies that we
observed. To further explore this issue, we examined the relation-
ship between sampling frequencies and the proportions of risky
choices in both age groups, and found no signiﬁcant correlations.
This is consistent with ﬁndings in the behavioral decision-making
literature which suggest that the impact of additional experience
on choice is modest, and that participants’ default strategy is to
rely on small samples despite the fact that small samples are more
susceptible to sampling error (e.g., Hau et al., 2010; Hertwig and
Pleskac, 2010).
In addition to testing speciﬁc hypotheses, the study also allowed
us to address a set of exploratory research questions. The ﬁrst
of these questions concerned valence effects on experience-based
decision making. To our knowledge, the current study was the ﬁrst
to systematically compare experience-based choice for gains and
losses using the same choice problems. Both age groups sampled
more in the face of losses than they did in the face of gains. Regard-
less of age, loss anticipation thus appears to energize predecisional
information search more strongly than gain anticipation, consis-
tent with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) inﬂuential loss-aversion
hypothesis. Both age groups also showed greater adaptive modula-
tion of risk taking for losses than for gains. Overall, these ﬁndings
suggest that experience-based choice is affected by the valence of
the choice options, but they offer no evidence to suggest that the
nature of this modulation changes with age.
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The second exploratory question concerned age differences in
overall risk preference. Across both the gain and loss domains,
the average proportion of risky choices was similar for younger
and older adults, contrary to the widely held notion that aging
is associated with increased risk aversion. Mata et al. (2011) sug-
gested that age differences in risk preference are a by-product of
age-related learning impairments, which can manifest differently
in different tasks. In the current study, there was no evidence for
an age-related learning deﬁcit, as both age groups showed similar
sensitivity to variation in outcome probabilities. The lack of an
age effect on overall risk preference is thus consistent with Mata
et al.’s (2011) view.
The third exploratory question concerned payoff variability, an
aspect of risk that combines the probability and magnitude of
outcomes. Consistent with a previous study with younger adults
(Hau et al., 2010, Experiment 1), the effects of payoff variability
on experience-based decision making were relatively subtle. The
most notable ﬁnding here was that, for both age groups, increased
payoff variability led to modest linear increases in both sampling
and risky choice on loss trials, but not on gain trials. This ﬁnding
further highlights the impact of valence on experiential decision
making.
In conclusion, the current ﬁndings add to the growing lit-
erature on aging and neuroeconomics by (a) providing novel
empirical observations of age differences in experience-based
choice, (b) on the basis of the dopamine hypothesis of cogni-
tive aging, testing hypotheses about speciﬁc cognitive processes
involved in experience-based choice, and (c) demonstrating the
need for greater integration of research in aging, neuroeconom-
ics, and behavioral economics. An obvious limitation of the
study was that we used behavioral methods to test predictions
derived from a neurobiological hypothesis. However, behavioral
data are valuable, indeed necessary, for testing and constrain-
ing models of neurocognitive age-related change (e.g., Frank and
Kong, 2008; Simon et al., 2010). In future work, a multimodal
approach that combines behavioral assessment with measure-
ment (or pharmacological manipulation) of dopamine biomark-
ers will be the method of choice for testing causal inﬂuences
of dopamine on experience-based choice in younger and older
adults.
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